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Abstract
Much recent work in metaontology challenges the so-called ‘Quinean tra-
dition’ in metaphysics. Especially prominently, Amie Thomasson argues for
a highly permissive ontology over ontologies which eliminate many entities.
I am concerned with disputing not her ontological claim, but the method-
ology behind her rejection of eliminativism—I focus on ordinary objects.
Thomasson thinks that by endorsing the Quinean criterion of ontological
commitment eliminativism goes wrong; a theory eschewing quantification
over a kind may nonetheless be committed to its existence. I argue that,
contrary to Thomasson’s claims, we should retain the Quinean criterion.
Her arguments show that many eliminativist positions are flawed, but their
flaws lie elsewhere: the Quinean criterion is innocent. Showing why reveals
the importance of pragmatism in ontology.
In §1 I compare Thomasson’s account and the eliminativist views to
which it stands in opposition. In §2 I re-construct Thomasson’s reasoning
behind rejecting the Quinean criterion. In §3 I defend the Quinean crite-
rion, showing that the eliminativists’ flaws are not consequences of applying
the Quinean criterion, before explaining the criterion’s importance when
properly understood. I conclude that Thomasson, though right to criticise
the methodology of ordinary-object eliminativists, is wrong to identify the
Quinean criterion as the source of their mistake.
1 Science and common sense in conflict
Take as a starting-point two intuitions:
(Ordinary) There are chairs, footballs, rocks, etc.
(Simple) Physics tells us that a description of the world in terms of interactions
between fundamental particles is in some sense complete.1
Call the objects vaguely picked out by (Ordinary) ‘ordinary objects’. Many
metaphysicians have been exercised by the question whether one should accept
ordinary objects in light of the character and success of scientific explanation:
1If the reader finds this implausible they may substitute another intuition in lieu of (Simple);
I will not take a stand here and this intuition is merely the most straightforward example.
Specifically, the reader may expand the domain that purports to achieve completeness without
undermining the apparent conflict as long as the associated scientific ontology remains sparser
than the plenitude endorsed by (Ordinary).
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whether one can reasonably hold (Ordinary) and (Simple) together. This worry
comes from a prima facie conflict between saying that we are done describing
how things are before we get round to even mentioning ordinary objects and
maintaining that they nonetheless exist. There is certainly something calling for
explanation here, but some have seen it as particularly pressing. To see why, we
now examine eliminativism about ordinary objects.
1.1 Ordinary-object eliminativism
This class of responses to the conflict holds that one cannot reasonably maintain
both (Ordinary) and (Simple) so, in view of the support for (Simple) implicit in
scientific success, we must reject (Ordinary). It would be unhelpful to catalogue
every route to this conclusion; we will rehearse just two.
Merricks (2001) holds that (Ordinary) and (Simple) are in conflict because to-
gether they produce causal overdetermination. Consider an event ‘as of’ a football
breaking a window, that is, one that would typically be described by:
(1) The (kicking of the) football caused the window to break.
When it comes to providing a precise account of this event, physics is apparently
privileged because its explanation fits desiderata like generality, simplicity, and
repeatability. In the clearest description of the event in physical terms, however,
the description ‘the football’ does not feature. The following statement would be
closer:
(2) The (movement of the) particles p1 . . . pn caused the window to break.
2
What then caused the window to break? One might think it incoherent to claim
that both the football and p1 . . . pn caused the window to break, but if not it
nonetheless looks unnecessary to identify both the football and p1 . . . pn as causes
of the breakage. It would be bold indeed to reject the microphysical description in
response to this, so Merricks claims that for reasons of parsimony we should reject
(1) and, generalising, that we should accept only simples into our ontology since
they do all the causal ‘work’ required. As the objects endorsed by (Ordinary) are
all complex the intuition is then clearly ruled out, resolving the conflict.
Van Inwagen (1990) and Horgan and Potrč (2000) argue against ordinary ob-
jects from a different perspective. They are interested in answering the special
composition question:
(SCQ) When is there some y such that the xs compose y?
Their answers to the question are different: van Inwagen’s positive answer to
(SCQ) is “When the xs constitute a life,” making living things the only complex
concrete objects, whereas Horgan and Potrč hold that “When there are no simples
distinct from the xs,” best answers (SCQ), making the only complex concrete
object the ‘blobject’ which makes up the whole cosmos. Yet they agree that no
satisfactory answer to (SCQ) endorses ordinary objects. Amie Thomasson offers
roughly this re-construction of their reasoning:
2This description, assuming that it is better than (1), is for obvious reasons only marginally so
(if the football shouldn’t figure, nor should the window). It would be cumbersome to modify the
statement wholesale, so in this and later cases attention should be paid only to the contextually
salient terms.
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(3) No acceptable uniform answer to (SCQ) gives us ordinary objects,
(4) No non-uniform answer to (SCQ) can be acceptable,
(5) If no acceptable answer to (SCQ) says there are ordinary objects, there
are no ordinary objects,
(6) Therefore, there are no ordinary objects. (2007, 127)
Briefly, (3) is justified by noting the diverse existence-conditions needed to explain
all the varieties of ordinary object. (4) is motivated by intuitions about what
constitutes satisfactory metaphysical explanation—metaphysical questions should
not be treated as settled by unexplained disjunctions. (5) follows from endorsing
(SCQ) as a way of framing this ontological debate. (6) is entailed by (3)–(5).
To put the argument informally, the concern is that there is no systematic way
of understanding composition such that ordinary objects exist but extraordinary
ones do not: why, for instance, should one plurality of particles constitute a table,
and another a lamp, while those pluralities together don’t constitute a table-
lamp?3 Not wanting to proliferate ontology, an eliminativist of this stripe discards
ordinary objects, while the objects covered by (Simple) are protected because they
are uniformly explicable (they make up the base of xs without which (SCQ) can’t
get going).
Further details of these two compatible ways to motivate ordinary-object elim-
inativism are unimportant for current purposes. We now move on to Thomasson’s
response. Note that one could respond to the problematic conflict by accepting the
intuitions’ incompatibility but instead rejecting (Simple), for instance by claim-
ing that irreducible features of reality are captured by things outside the remit of
natural science (though see n. 1 for why (Simple) would only be comprehensively
rejected if we accepted a lot more entities), or by claiming that physics does not
talk about objects at all, perhaps endorsing an account like that of van Fraassen
(1980). Thomasson instead insists that (Ordinary) and (Simple) are compatible.
1.2 Easy ontology and ordinary objects
Thomasson’s position (2007; 2014) is that ordinary objects are compatible with
the simples posited by natural science because they are not in any appropriate
sense rivals, and ordinary objects’ existence is a simple consequence of basic state-
ments about the world. In recent work Thomasson refers to her approach as
neo-Carnapian, but I will avoid this terminology because of the complications
it brings to the discussion.4 Instead I will use the less controversial name, easy
ontology. I will briefly explain Thomasson’s positive account and her response
3As the minutiae of the argument are not central to my paper, I have freely used ‘plurality’
for elegance without worrying about the fact that this term smuggles in singular reference.
4The appellation ‘neo-Carnapian’ is problematic because many different people (especially
Putnam (1987) and Hirsch (2009)) have claimed inheritance of Carnap’s intellectual project, and
while Thomasson is aware of this and argues for her right to the classification in her (2014) I do
not wish to invite questions about that controversy here. Her view also has striking connections
to neo-Fregeanism acknowledged by Thomasson herself (see her (2009, 2) and (2014, ch. 3)),
because its transformations from ontologically innocent statements to ontologically committing
statements draw on ideas from the work of Hale and Wright (2001, 2009), but I will also avoid
stressing this connection.
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to eliminativists before exploring the main ground of contention for this paper:
parsimony.
Thomasson claims that evaluating the truth of statements involving any singu-
lar or general term requires an understanding of that term’s application conditions,
determined by the kind of thing it denotes. To take a key example of hers (2007,
58), if you point to a hill on which some physical mass is located and say “I
hereby baptise that thing Smod,” if I can only tell that you are naming whatever
is sticking out of the hillside, I can’t answer questions like “Would Smod survive
a fire?” or “Would Smod survive disassembly?” If you have something in mind
in your baptism, it has to be identified under a sortal, e.g., physical aggregate, or-
ganism, artifact, otherwise you would not be genuinely individuating something.
If things must be identified under sortals, though, the application conditions asso-
ciated with those sortals will provide a minimal conceptual content to statements
concerning them—the very content that answers questions like those asked about
Smod. These contents, she claims, produce analytic entailments that tell us, e.g.,
“If there is a continuous portion of mineraloid matter clearly differentiable from
its surroundings, there is a rock (in that space).” However, as ‘it’s overwhelmingly
obvious that the world does satisfy these conditions’ (Thomasson 2007, 159), there
are rocks. The same follows for all manner of other ordinary objects, whose ex-
istence is thus guaranteed by the application-conditions of sortal terms alongside
simple empirical facts. This allows us to see physical simples and ordinary objects
not as rivals but as inextricably linked by sortals; if the simples are arranged in
the right way it is a direct consequence that the sortal applies and therefore that
the ordinary object exists.
1.3 Overcoming parsimony
As things stand these two positions might seem at an impasse. Although Thomas-
son claims to show that there is nothing especially problematic about accepting
both ordinary objects and simples, she acknowledges that on a common under-
standing of the significance of parsimony, the eliminativist has an advantage over
the easy ontologist. The latter does better at satisfying common-sense intuitions,
but the former looks more parsimonious. She insists, however, that the parsimony
claimed by the eliminativist is illusory. If this is true it places easy ontology on
much firmer ground than eliminativism: while it is a widely-accepted benefit of
positions like easy ontology that they endorse certain common-sense claims, the
eliminativist tends to play down these benefits, saying that their approach has
minimal costs while providing far more substantial gains of parsimony. If there
are no such gains, the easy ontologist deals a serious blow to the eliminativist’s
ambitions.
How does Thomasson argue this? The eliminativist claims to be committed
only to simples, while the easy ontologist is obviously committed to far more
than that. The eliminativist then reasons via Occam’s razor that as multiple
entities must not be posited without necessity, their sparser ontology is at an
advantage. Thomasson undermines this by denying that the posits are ‘without
necessity’, which she does through a critique of the Quinean criterion of ontological
commitment.5
5This critique places Thomasson’s account in a similar position to a number of other criticisms
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2 Throwing out the bathwater
The eliminativist accepts that there are certain explanatory criteria for the success
of their project: it certainly won’t be satisfying if the eliminativist insists that there
are no ordinary objects yet refuses to explain how things actually are. Furthermore
it is incumbent upon the eliminativist to explain the intuition (Ordinary)—why
did it seem in order to speak as if those things existed? Their standard strategy
involves appeal to the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment.
(Criterion)
A theory is committed to those and only those entities to which the bound
variables of the theory must be capable of referring in order that the affir-
mations made in the theory be true. (Quine 1948, 33)
Take the statement:
(7) Alex is sitting in a chair.
How is the eliminativist to understand such statements? Following (Criterion),
the obvious translation of the sentence into the idiom of first-order predicate logic
(to determine where bound variables occur in the statement) reads something like:
(8) ∃x(Chair(x) ∧ Sit(A, x)).
The eliminativist, however, offers an alternative translation into what Thomasson
calls a ‘language of refuge’ (2007, 164). Though the above statement would commit
us to chairs, of which the eliminativist says there are none, we can instead say
(9) ∃x1 . . . ∃xn(Chairwise(x1 . . . xn) ∧ Sit∗(A, x1, . . . , xn)).
Here ‘chairwise’ denotes a relation in which some things stand to each other just in
situations where one would ordinarily utter statements relevantly like (7).6 Thus
the bound variables of the theory giving (7)’s truth-conditions need not refer to
complex objects satisfying the predicate ‘chair’, but only to objects standing in
the relation ‘chairwise’, which could be simples. To return to the challenges with
which we opened this section, the condition for the eliminativist’s success is then
the ability to provide such paraphrases for statements we typically hold true,
and they claim that statements like (8) seem in order despite repudiating chairs
because a straightforward and tempting translation of (7) would commit us to
chairs.
According to Thomasson, some sleight-of-hand has taken place here. The form
of a theory does not always give a full account of its ontological commitments by
her reckoning because when a set of conditions is described one may thereby com-
mit oneself to the existence of things fulfilling those conditions. Take the above
purported application conditions for ‘rock’: by introducing a ‘rockwise’-relation,
the eliminativist might aim to avoid a commitment to rocks, but the eliminativist
of Quinean metaontology that focus on permissiveness, e.g. Hirsch (2005); Fine (2009); Schaffer
(2009). However these rely on different notions: quantifier variance for the former, and grounding
for the latter two. Thus while my defence is relevant to these other positions, further exposition
and argument would be required to fully apply it to them.
6Note also that Sit and Sit∗ are not the same relation: the former is ordinarily a two-place
relation between sitter and sat-in, while the latter is (at least) an n + 1-place relation between
sitter and sit-in-able arrangement of n simples.
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and the easy ontologist in fact agree about the worldly conditions under which
the term ‘rockwise’ applies. The eliminativist says “I don’t quantify over rocks
but only over simples arranged rockwise, making my ontology more parsimonious
than your rocky ontology.” The easy ontologist can then ask, “Under what con-
ditions does the ‘rockwise’ relation apply?” and provided the eliminativist gives
an adequate answer the easy ontologist will insist that those just are the condi-
tions under which there exists a rock constituted by said simples, representable as
follows:
(10) ∀x1 . . . ∀xn[Chairwise(x1 . . . xn) → ∃y(Chair(y) ∧ Const(x1 . . . xn, y))].7
If (10) is true, then the existence of chairs is entailed by (9), a statement which
the eliminativist accepts! Furthermore she thinks that (10) is part of the content
of the concept chair even though it need not be part of the theory being analysed.
Thus the eliminativist is guilty of halting the conversation before it is over. They
might respond that there is some condition that is not met, but most candidates
for this are rejected by Thomasson as being methodologically out of place. For
instance, one might say that the condition constituting a genuine unity is not
met, but it looks like this condition is ad hoc and represents nothing more than
dogmatic insistence that certain candidates fail to be real objects.
Thomasson thus declares that (Criterion), by virtue of over-extending the de-
mands of parsimony, is a bad metaontological principle.8 While parsimony can
apply when seeking genuine causes, e.g. in murder investigations (where, ce-
teris paribus, one murderer is a better hypothesis than two), eliminability in the
statement of a theory does not track eliminability from ontology. (Criterion),
Thomasson says, describes a sufficient condition on commitment but crucially not
a necessary one because theories can be made to quantify over fewer entities than
they are actually committed to. Generating commitments with (Criterion) would
therefore leave us with the further task of checking the application conditions
of our concepts and determining whether their content had been accommodated.
Furthermore, while one could proceed in this two-stage manner, Thomasson claims
that her method would uncover any commitments found by (Criterion) anyway.
She concludes that a metaontology treating fulfilment of (Criterion) as neces-
sary and sufficient for ontological commitment ought to be abandoned in favour
a metaontology informed by considerations about the conceptual content of the
singular and general terms we employ.
Before we look closer at this argument, one point must be cleared up: given the
argument on which Thomasson relies, is the easy ontologist committed to the use-
lessness of paraphrase? To be brief, no. Thomasson acknowledges that paraphrase
is sometimes informative and useful. However she thinks that paraphrase can only
7This illustrates both a justification for the possible label ‘neo-Fregean’ and the need for a
qualification. While similar to typical neo-Fregean transformations like Hume’s Principle, this is
not a biconditional for Thomasson because being particulate is not part of the concept chair. The
key feature remains that an ontologically committing transformation demonstrates the hidden
commitments of the original, unproblematic statement.
8Thomasson claims this only conditional on the existence of analytic entailments. Quine
was not ignorant of this kind of argument, she thinks, but had an easy way out because of his
scepticism about analyticity. This raises questions both about Quine’s views on analyticity and
meaning and about whether eliminativists’ views require a rejection of said notions, which must
be left for elsewhere.
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be helpfully applied in situations where no analytic entailments derive from the
conceptual content of the terms involved. The utility of paraphrase in ontology
has been motivated by analogy to post-Copernican understandings of “The Sun
moved behind the trees,” moving from an understanding of the sentence entailing
the Sun’s movement to one entailing only a change of relative position (van Inwa-
gen 1990), but we are free to reinterpret statements like this as it is implausible
to suppose that ‘the Sun’ ever had a conceptual content which entailed that the
Sun moved.
3 Rescuing the baby
Thomasson thinks that eliminativists about ordinary objects have it too easy: that
their claims to avoid commitment to ordinary objects through their strategies of
paraphrase are ill-founded. I am inclined to agree on this front, but disagree with
Thomasson’s diagnosis of the problem. She finds fault with (Criterion) for mis-
takenly absolving us of commitments, but I claim that in fact (Criterion) does not
sanction ordinary-object eliminativism unless it is supplemented by independent
principles. It must be elsewhere that the blame lies.
3.1 Ontology as interpretation
Though van Inwagen (1998, 2009) denies that (Criterion) can be parsed as an
informative simple statement within Quinean metaontology in his influential at-
tempts to articulate that metaontology,9 our above quote (§2) seems to provide
at least a reasonable statement of its content. Let us first deal with the more
straightforward parts of assessment. For our purposes we can be liberal about
what a theory is—just treat a theory as a set of statements. Note also that on
the Quinean conception it is the theory that incurs commitment to entities so our
commitment to some entity requires that it be our theory that is committed to
its existence. We can treat a statement as part of our theory when it is either
explicitly endorsed by some plausibly large critical mass of members of the com-
munity or is entailed by a set of such statements. Lastly, it has been observed by,
e.g., Bricker (2014, §1.1) that when talking of Quine’s criterion one can intend a
weaker, descriptive version that simply provides the commitments of a given the-
ory, or a stronger, prescriptive version that tells us that our all-things-considered
commitments should be those of our best theory. We will typically speak of the
descriptive version because that captures the core content of (Criterion): how-
ever I also show below that considering the strong reading should not change our
verdict.
The interesting, and difficult, questions arise with regard to the ‘must be ca-
pable of referring’ part of (Criterion). To what must a statement be capable of
referring for it to be true? There is no automatic method for answering this ques-
tion, except insofar as it is determined by the things that are candidates to be
9Concerns have been raised by, e.g., Eklund (2006b, 96), Price (2009), and Jenkins (2010,
884) about the viability and accuracy of the common understanding of Quinean metaontology.
Thomasson seems to be alive to this concern, describing her opponents in her (2014, ch. 1) as
‘neo-Quinean’.
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substituted in for variables in the statement’s translation into ‘canonical notation’.
Thomasson is aware of this. Nonetheless, she treats (Criterion) as a rather blunt
tool and so, it seems, do eliminativists. Statements like (2) and (9) are treated as
in themselves avoiding quantification over ordinary objects. On this assumption it
is hard to object to eliminativists’ translations, and accordingly Thomasson does
not complain about them, saying
I have no intention of impugning the clever paraphrases devised by van
Inwagen and others, which (when properly done) properly preserve the
role human intentions, practices, and so on play in the truth-conditions
of these sentences. (2007, 161)
Thus the eliminativist can more-or-less stipulate that the relation in the para-
phrase tracks the problematic concept: if we understand the predicate ‘chair’, we
understand the relation ‘chairwise’. However, two points are in order.
First, the overall theory is significant to whether we can plausibly understand
these translations. For a simple case, suppose that we consider whether to accept
some kind F into our theory: if the remainder of the theory we are operating
within provides a more useful, explanatory account of the phenomena in which
F purportedly figures in terms of two sub-kinds F1 and F2, the Quinean is more
likely to hold that F s need not be in our ontology than if we lacked such sub-kinds,
especially if the reasons for accepting F1 and F2 were not directly related to the
reasons for considering F . Thomasson often neglects this, identifying the focus as
on accepting ‘fewer things ’ (2007, 154) and only rarely approaching the question
in terms of kinds whose explanatory power might cut across one another. It thus
bears on what we take the commitments of (2) and (9) to be whether we take
statements involving ordinary objects to be excisable across the board.
Second, the question of what the variables of a theory must be capable of
ranging over cannot be a merely formal or representational constraint. One could
take a theory’s variables to range simply over the natural numbers by using the
right model-theoretic methods: find a model for the theory, by the downward
Löwenheim-Skolem theorem find a model of it with cardinality ω (provided the
uncontroversial assumption that the language is countable), and design a 1-1 proxy
function taking terms to natural numbers. Quine explains the possibility of such
a move in his (1968, 206–8). This does not mean that each theory including
mathematical truths should have its variables understood as ranging over only
the natural numbers because that fails too badly as an explanation of how we
understand the world. By the same token, one can provide obviously unintended
permutations of reference, following Putnam (1977),10 if we lack this constraint.
Here’s the rub. The eliminativist’s insistence that one can offer an analysis
of these statements without quantifying over ordinary objects does not tell us
whether one can offer a good analysis of such statements fitting that requirement.
We start with a community from which certain utterances issue. It is up to us
to determine what overall structure to assign those utterances, and without some
justification it looks implausible that some relation like ‘chairwise’ could be made
sense of unless it were appropriate to say “There are chairs.” As noted above, if we
10Or indeed following Quine (1960). Putnam’s arguments arise from the same ground as
Quine’s arguments for the inscrutability of reference, though they extend it to cover, e.g., modal
statements.
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understand ‘chair’ we understand ‘chairwise’: just as well we understand ‘chair’
then!
This observation might not move the eliminativist, who will insist that episte-
mological notions do not flawlessly track ontological ones, so ‘no one should reject
eliminativism on the grounds that, to understand what it is to be arranged stat-
uewise, one must first know what statues are supposed to be’ (Merricks 2001, 7).
Merricks motivates this claim by analogy, saying that it would be absurd to argue
for an ontologically committing understanding of ‘wearing a smile’ by saying that
to know what it is to smile one must first know what smiles are supposed to be.
This is indeed a bad argument, but I would say that this is mostly because one
doesn’t need to first know what a smile is in order to know what it is to smile. On
the other hand, as Merricks notes, the predicate ‘statue’ plays an important role
not just for understanding ‘statuewise’ but for ‘what makes it the case that certain
atomic features are those upon which, if there were statues, statue composition
would supervene’ (ibid.). I find it difficult to see therefore how Merricks’ claim
can be persuasive. How far epistemology and ontology come apart is a fraught
question, but it is implausible that they can come so far apart that understand-
ing how we come to individuate as we do is irrelevant.11 To hold otherwise is to
endorse a conception of metaphysics on which its task is entirely distinct from the
task of understanding people as language-users.
This sits poorly with a Quinean approach to ontology—at least if, as we should,
we take Quine as having some authority in delineating that approach.12 He clearly
says that ordinary objects are a benchmark against which the very adequacy of
the theory that is supposed to threaten them is checked:
We cannot properly represent [humans] as inventing a myth of physical
objects to fit past and present sense data, for past ones are lost except
to memory; and memory, far from being a straightforward register of
past sense data, usually depends on past posits of physical objects.
The positing of physical objects must be seen not as an ex post facto
systematization of data, but as a move prior to which no appreciable
data would be available to systematize. (Quine 1976, 251)
Quine (1995) equated explaining and explaining away (where the latter is arguably
equivalent to elimination), but by his lights the requirement of explanation, and
thus of elimination, is not met in the case of chairwise and statuewise relations.
The objects they are based on figure importantly in building and justifying the
very theory that eliminativists seek to use to explain away their existence. Without
specific motivation for thinking that we can discount that explanatory role once
our theory is under way, a Quinean approach should not sanction eliminativism.
The eliminativist might maintain that they are not in trouble because it is only
appropriate to say that chairs exist either in a loose sense (Merricks’ defence) or
when ‘outside the ontology room’ (van Inwagen’s defence). To say this, however,
11Merricks’ discussion of this issue at times suggests that his target is someone who holds that
considerations of conceptual dependence render eliminativism absurd. That these results do not
render it impossible to be an eliminativist, however, does not prevent them from loading the
dice against it.
12In support of this, Matti Eklund describes the Quinean approach as a ‘linguistic [approach]
to ontology’ (2006a, 327). There is much more to be said about how this feature of Quinean
metaontology impacts the approach, but that goes beyond the remit of this paper.
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is to introduce new and problematic principles. By abandoning the requirement
that there be a robust connection between language-use and our metaphysical
theory, eliminativists open up the possibility of theories whose relevance is highly
questionable. On such a view we should allow for metaphysical reality to differ
drastically from what can be clearly expressed. A case in point:
Imagine a world consisting entirely of gunkish, jello-ish, stuff. Sup-
pose that this jello-world is literally partless, and yet also exhibits
local variation. . . what would be an appropriate way to describe how
various features are instantiated by the jello in various spatiotempo-
rally local ways? One natural-looking way would be to introduce a
linguistic/conceptual framework that posits certain kinds of discrete
entities, and attributes various features to them. (Horgan and Potrc,
2000, 249–50)
This picture makes it totally unclear why language is at all relevant to ontology.
It’s mysterious how to consistently describe a ‘literally partless’ entity with lo-
cal variations since these would seem to be differences in its parts, so if this is
nevertheless possible then it seems pointless to worry about paraphrase because
language is not equipped to capture the fantastical extremes of possibility.13 This
would place us in the remit of what Thomas Hofweber has called esoteric meta-
physics, on which conception ‘one needs to understand distinctly metaphysical
terms in order for one to understand what the questions are that metaphysics
tries to answer’ (Hofweber 2009, 267).
That kind of approach would arise if, for instance, we were to accept a ‘con-
ceivability implies possibility’ principle where conceivability outstrips linguistic
expression and is authoritative for metaphysics. An even clearer route to esoteric
metaphysics comes from the aforementioned ‘ontology room’ move that denies any
interest on the metaphysician’s part in understanding the linguistic community,
insisting instead that ‘only metaphysicians. . . have ever considered—ever enter-
tained, ever grasped, ever held before their minds—[metaphysical propositions]’
(van Inwagen 2014, 6). If other eliminativists wish to distance themselves from
these extra assumptions, the onus is on them to demonstrate that a more austere
Quinean approach does indeed sanction their account, and no such demonstration
is in evidence.
Indeed (Criterion) itself is, in Hofweber’s terms, distinctly ‘egalitarian’, that
is, it takes the key metaphysical questions to be ‘expressed in ordinary, everyday
terms, accessible to all’ (2009, 266). This is immediately clear on (Criterion)’s
descriptive reading since then it simply tells us the commitments of a theory
without discounting or altering its statements but it is true even on the stronger,
prescriptive reading. The descriptive version of (Criterion) looks for what must be
the case for a theory taken as a whole to be true, while the prescriptive version of
the same looks for what must be the case for the best theory taken as a whole to
be true. Neither version makes any reference to goals of specifically metaphysical
importance. Of course if what one has to clarify turns out to be a rarefied version
of our shared theory then, provided it was rarefied by metaphysical considerations,
13It is relevant to note that (Horgan and Potrc̆, 2008, ch. 3) describe their approach as
something one retreats to if one finds the Quinean approach ultimately unsatisfactory, meaning
that the approach is not an extension to Quineanism but a revision to it.
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we would have esoteric metaphysics, but however this move was made it would
not be (Criterion) that took us down this path.14
I have suggested that (Criterion) won’t, without implausible supplementary
claims, sanction the elimination of ordinary objects. This suggests a problem: if
it doesn’t sanction such reinterpretation, do we even need (Criterion)? Is it just
a platitudinous requirement to ‘read off’ the commitments of overall theory? No:
I will close by briefly indicating some complexities for (Criterion) is useful. As
well as serving the purpose of showing that (Criterion) is not platitudinous, these
cases are somewhat problematic for thinkers like Thomasson.
3.2 Not so easy
While in the case of ordinary objects Thomasson’s arguments have initial plausi-
bility, elsewhere it is not obvious how her analysis should proceed. She defends
her account on more general grounds in Thomasson (2014) but this assumes the
efficacy of her rejection of Quinean metaontology and focusses on defending the
coherence of her own position. As we have found reason to be suspicious of her
claim to undermine the Quinean approach, I will instead offer some object-level
issues on which the Quinean might enjoy an advantage over Thomasson’s easy on-
tologist. It would take much time to give a satisfactory account of the intricacies,
but I will briefly state some very commonplace examples that require us to think
more carefully about what we need to quantify over.
3.2.1 Metaphor
Take the statement
(11) Alex has a monkey on her back,
and its flat-footed translation
(12) ∃x(Monkey(x) ∧ x is on the back of a).
It seems part of the content of the term ‘monkey’ that when people meet worldly
conditions like high stress-levels it is felicitous to utter statements like (11), pro-
viding easy existence-conditions for these special kinds of monkey.15
14Indeed whether the outcome is even possible hinges on what one takes the role of the ‘best
theory’ element of the prescriptive version of (Criterion) to be. It could be argued that it is
unavoidably tied up with Quinean naturalism, and it’s far from clear that that approach is
consistent with esoteric metaphysics since it will rule out special metaphysical reasons to reject
something despite its explanatory role.
15An anonymous referee points out that one might argue that felicity is irrelevant here since
in such cases the relevant concept’s application conditions are evidently not met. However this
reply would only work if we assumed a particular analysis from the outset. The felicity of the
statement provides prima facie warrant for taking it seriously, where the paradigmatic way of
taking a statement seriously is to treat it as true. To suppose that this use of ‘monkey’ violates
the term’s application conditions simply assumes in advance that it does not fall within the
range of uses that determine the term’s application conditions. This would be a bad approach
to take generally, since there are many cases where a decision regarding metaphor is difficult;
even statements like “I’m going down to the shops” have sometimes been alleged to involve
metaphor. We simply do not have sufficient consensus on metaphor to actually execute a directive
to discount metaphor when examining application conditions.
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Of course one might ultimately analyse (11) using a literal/non-literal distinc-
tion, or by various means of distinguishing what is said in a metaphor from what
is meant, but it isn’t clear that in an ordinary utterance of this metaphor I’m
even non-literally saying, or saying without meaning, anything like (12). If either
contextualism (see Bezuidenhout 2001) or non-cognitivism (see Davidson 1978) is
ever interpretatively appropriate, even for dead and dying metaphors, we might
find it highly unattractive to attribute ontological commitments, even figurative
ones, despite surface form and the availability of transformation rules from stress-
invoking statements to metaphorical monkey statements. The focus sanctioned by
(Criterion) on overall theory over individual conceptual content makes it easier to
see a route to a reasonable interpretation than on the easy ontology approach.16
3.2.2 Figures of speech
Certain not clearly metaphorical figures of speech are also problematic without
(Criterion), e.g.
(13) She has a lot of smarts,
(14) Something tells me you’re right,
(15) Some things are better left unsaid.
On a ‘deflationary’ theory like Thomasson’s17 we might find ontologically com-
mitting analyses of these acceptable: indeed Thomasson suggests so in her (2013,
1042–3). However, despite these statements not being terribly threatening given
that there is no risk of being asked to present before one’s peers the things such
that they are better left unsaid, it might look like a straightforward misunder-
standing of ordinary language here to give the ontologically committing analyses.
In this sense one accusation Thomasson levels at eliminativists, of deviating from
language-use, can be aimed back at her unless she accepts an additional complex-
ity in analysing ontological commitments that importantly seems to be captured
by (Criterion). The proponent of (Criterion) need not treat the ontologically com-
mitting analyses of (13)–(15) as legitimate but with a certain ‘weirdness’, as long
as they have available interpretations without commitments that do not cause
trouble elsewhere in the theory.18
16This presupposes that the Quinean can survive a different challenge mounted by Yablo
(1998) that their approach requires a sharp literal/non-literal distinction that cannot in fact be
given. I cannot respond to this challenge here, but it seems that if it is a problem it threatens
all attempts to answer the ontological question so is not a specific threat to the Quinean.
17See (Sider, 2011, ch. 9) for extended, if unsympathetic, consideration of variants of defla-
tionism.
18Thomasson (2014, 264–5) also proposes an alternative solution for cases like the term ‘sake’.
She says that these terms lack any ‘coapplication conditions’ that would allow people to make
judgements of identity and distinctness about the relevant entities, so should not be seen as
ontologically committing. I doubt, however, that there is a divide as strong as Thomasson needs
in this respect. Certain judgements of distinctness at least are likely to be assented to: for
instance, if actions done for A’s sake are against B’s interests and vice versa, I imagine that
most English speakers would say that A’s sake and B’s sake must be distinct. One can’t make
judgements across the board, but as Thomasson accepts our concepts typically have limitations
in this respect. In response to a similar worry she concedes (2014, 265, n. 8) that this alternative
might not be viable.
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3.2.3 Going beyond usage
A final, more general, concern comes when we consider how to arrive at the trans-
formation rules for ordinary language. Given that language-use is varied, often
inconsistent and always finite, the easy ontologist’s transformations will not be
sanctioned based purely on use. We are unlikely to find that complete application-
conditions simply fall out of common practice, but if we move outside actual use
easy ontology rapidly inflates. If I can render consistent and pad out application-
conditions for ordinary terms, it seems that I can just as easily construct suitable
rules for arbitrary combinations, leaving us endorsing table-lamps, trout-turkeys,
and stranger entities. There is after all nothing missing from the principle
(16) ∀x∀y[(Table(x) ∧ Lamp(y)) → ∃z(Const(x, y, z) ∧ Table-lamp(z))],
apart from the absence of ‘table-lamp’ from our vocabulary, which is a matter of
historical accident. The concerns of §§3.2.1 and 3.2.2 are in a sense restrictions of
this concern, so as before Thomasson can insist that deflationism takes the sting
out. However, accepting these entities loses her the endorsement of common sense.
One could press this worry in two ways. First one might say that it is almost
as much of a mandate of common sense that there are no trout-turkeys as that
there are tables. Thomasson (2007, 183–5) responds to this claim by saying that
common sense has nothing to say about table-lamps, trout-turkeys, etc., and that a
careful explanation of the terms’ content would lead lead most people to accept the
objects as non-threatening. This objection and reply appear to be at a stalemate
because they rely on empirical speculation about folk judgements. It is unclear how
one could justifiably claim to identify the extent of common-sense judgements, let
alone to evaluate modifications to common sense, but even ignoring this stumbling
block we now find Thomasson’s position at the mercy of how people happen to
respond to such novel concepts.
One might alternatively make the less drastic objection that there are substan-
tial limitations to common sense since we can at least agree that common sense
doesn’t say that there are table-lamps. Common sense also seems vulnerable to
the possibility of inconsistent usage (either intra- or inter-personal), so wherever
we reach the limits of common sense we will need to say something further, and we
lack an evident reason to choose Thomasson’s strategy over others. If Thomasson
wished to make her strategy unequivocally easy she would be caught here between
giving an incomplete and possibly inconsistent ontology of ordinary language, and
venturing into philosophically contentious claims by trying to provide a consistent
and general theory not limited by usage. In fact she says more reasonably that
inconsistencies should be weeded out by charitable interpretation (2014, 271) and
that cases where we don’t get a complete answer can be decided by stipulation
(ibid., §6.3).
These responses, while reasonable, raise a final worry. Interpretative charity,
and ontological legislation, are not evidently easy methods to apply. It is hard
to know what best respects requirements of charity (see Dennett (1987)) and
the consequences of legislating on an ontological debate may well be difficult to
track. Thomasson thinks, it seems, that the cases involving these are rare enough
that they should not feature centrally in her metaontology. However if, as I have
claimed, (Criterion) allows us to take a pragmatic approach that sometimes favours
ordinary use and sometimes favours simplicity, then provided it is not tied to an
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inegalitarian conception of metaphysics it will involve the same considerations of
charity and the same capacity for legislation as Thomasson includes. It is then
not clear that her approach in fact casts aside (Criterion)—but one might further
wonder whether, once it is divorced from esoteric applications, Thomasson would
want to target (Criterion) with her critique.19
Conclusion
In this paper I have claimed that while Thomasson is right to suspect ordinary-
object eliminativists of getting their results through bad principles, she is wrong
to identify the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment as one of these. Other
principles, like adherence to ‘ontology room’ metaphysics, drive the justification
for ordinary-object eliminativism; furthermore the Quinean criterion is informative
in contexts that Thomasson’s approach struggles with. Thomasson lights on an
important concern: that metaphysicians tend to play fast and loose with our
language as if something remarkable were meant by terms like ‘table’. However
respecting this should not lead us to treat the project of interpreting our theory
as always easy.20
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